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APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, UINTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

HONORABLE RlCHAIHl C.

lJ1\Vlll:1Ui~.

Jlllll;r:

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is a quiet title action brought by Joseph
Fazzio and Maxine Taylor as the owners of mineral interests in
certain real property located in Uintah County, Utah and Fuel
Exploration,

Inc., a lessee of the Fazzio' s mineral interest,

against Phillips Petroleum Company, its successors and assigns,
which purport to claim an interest in the mineral estate of the
Fazzios by virtue of oil and gas ledses executed by the
Fazzios' predecessors in interest in the 1940's and SO's, and
against other parties claiming an interest in the subject
property adverse to, or constituting a cloud upon, Plaintiffs'
interest.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Defendant Phillips Petroleum Company, joined by
De fend ant Roos eve 1 t Lin it,

Inc. , res ponded to the Mended

Complaint of the Plaintiffs by filing a Motion to Dismiss,
which was granted bv the Honorable Richrird C. 11;.ividson, J11d's''
of the Seventh Judicial District Court.

3
o·.1nsequently denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration and
:lotion for Leave to Amend the Complaint.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiffs, Joseph and Maxine T. Fazzio,
!hereinafter referred to as the "Fazzios" or "Plaintiffs") own
rnineral interests in the following described real property in
Uintah County, Utah:
Townshio 1 South, Range 1 West, U.S.M.
Section 24:
Sl/2 NWl/4.
Also, beginning at a point 60.0 rods
West of the Southeast corner of the
SWl /4 of Section 24; and running thence
West 60.0 rods; thence North 160.0
rods; thence East 60.0 rods; thence
South 160.0 rods to the place of
beginning.
Also, beginning at the Southwest
corner of the SWl/4 of Section 24; and
running thence North 160. 0 rods; thence
East 40.0 rods; thence South 160.0 rods;
thence West 40.0 rods to the place of
beginning. (Containing 180 acres, more
or less).
These lands, and the lands involved in a companion
case, Taylor, et al, vs.

Phillips Petroleum Co., et al.,

(Case

:lo. 191b0) are plotted on Exhibit "A" hereto.
On November 30,
t1terest,

1945 the Plaintiffs' predecessors in

the parents and maternal grandparents of Maxine

,·z1u,

Leslie D. Taylor and his wife Audrey Whitlock, and

't,1rd

L. Whitlock and his wife, Nellie, entered into two

,•Jrdte leases with the Defendant Phillips Petroleum Company
1ereinafter referred to as "Phillips") covering lands in
·)e,·r1.rns ~3 dn1J

2'+ of Township 1 South,

Range 1 West,

U.S.M.,

4

and Sections 18 and Lu ot fuwnsr11f' I
U.S .M.

"''11!1,

"'·

(Paragraph 7 of the AmendPd Cnrnpl.ilrll

and "l3" thereto).

rnd

'.._ [) l t_

s

...

These leases, which dre hereiridtler referre·.J

to as the 1945 leases, were on printed forrns,

the standarJ

Producer Form 88 lease, used extensively throughout the westerc
states.

The leases were for primary terms of seven vears, and

so long thereafter as oil and gas were produced from the
property.

They provided for a royalty of I/8th of anv oil,

or other hydrocarbons produced from the premises.

~as

Phillips,

under these respective leases, was required to begin operations
for drilling a well within one year from the date of the leas•.
If operations did not commence within one year the lease was c
terminate unless the lessee paid a "delay rental" in the dmounc
of

25~

per acre per year to hold the lease from vear to vear

for the primary term of the lease.
At the time the Plaintiffs' predecessors in interesc
entered into these leases with Phillips, Phillips was n1Jt
authorized to do business in the State of Utah under §1 o-8-5
Utah Code Ann.

(1943), which statute was then in effect.

Phillips became qualified to do husiness on June 14,

IY4b

(Paragraph 18 and Exhibit "U" 1Jf the Amended 1:urnpld1rit
A subsequent

lt:>ase,

dated

'.101.'t->r1DPr

obtained by Phillips from Nellie \Jh1tl.ic:e.,

I~,

1 <.-J

.n

111c11 ·1·i•1 ii I

-"'dS

,,,,,

5

,,11,in1strdtor for the estate of Wilford L. Whitlock, and from
Leslie

Tdylor and Audrey Whitlock Taylor.

lJ.

Exhibit "C" ot the Amended Complaint).

(Paragraph 8 and

This 1946 lease, which

is hereinafter referred to as the 1946 lease, differed from the

1945 leases in that it only covered the lands located in
Section L4.

This readjustment may have been attributable to

the deatn of Wilford Whitlock and the apportionment of his
interest among the Plaintiffs' predecessors.

The other land

contained in the 1945 leases, which was also leased to Phillips

by separate leases in 1946, is not involved in the present
litigation.

There was no actual change in the amount or area

leased to Phillips, onlv a change as to which leases covered
which property.

(Exhibits "A" and "B" to Defendant's Motion to

Dis,niss).
The term of the 1946 lease was for six years from
:iovember 20, l ':!46 -- in other words, the expiration of the
orimary term of the 1945 and 1946 leases was the same time.

A

clause requiring seismographic work to be performed on the
leased propertv contained in the 1945 leases was omitted from
rne

l~~o

·1dn~e
lf

lease.

The lessors were led to believe that this

was the main reason for the execution of the 194b lease

n•,rdpl1

,!ii

11t

the Alnended Complaint).

6

On November 7, 1950 Phillips entered into

'" Unit

Agreement for the Development dnd Operation of the tzoosevelt
Unit.

The definition of a "unit" as it applies here is the

area included in the joint operations of all or part of an oil
or gas bearing formation, without regard to the legal
boundaries overlying the formation, so as to maximize the
recovery and minimize the waste of the oil and gas and the
economic resources from drilling unnecessary wells.

All

parties which have an interest in the unit share in the total
production from the unit, usually in direct proportion to the
amount of lands they have committed to the unit.

A unit may be

formed through agreement, or by order of an agency of the state
or federal government, and may be comprised of one or several
"participating areas."

A participating area is all or a

portion of the unit area to which production from wells located
on the participating area is allocated and divided in
proportion to the interest held by the mineral owners.
may be one or more participating areas to a unit.

There

The history

of the formation of the Roosevelt Unit is contained in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Peterson 218 F.2d 1926 (10th Cir., 1':154), a
case dealing with Phillips' right to unitize lands under
lease.

7

Tne Roosevelt Unit appears to have had only one
Mrticipating area.

1

The participating area was contracted down

to its present size effective February 1, 1952 (Exhibit "G" of
the Affidavit of Nicholas F. McKean), excluding all but the
northernmost 80 acres of the lands leased by Phillips in 1946.
Later, effective February 1, 1954, the entire Roosevelt Unit
was contracted down to the size of the participating area.
The parties entered into an agreement on March 11
1952 whereby, notwithstanding the Unit Agreement,

Phillips

agreed to drill a well for the production of oil and gas on the
parcel covered by the 1946 lease excluded from the Roosevelt
Unit.

(Exhibit "A" to the Supplement to the Response to

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss).

A well appears to have been

drilled in that parcel in 1952, but was abandoned in 1954.
'.~xhibit

"B" to the Supplement).
On October 25, 1954 Phillips entered into an oil and

~as

lease with the Plaintiffs' predecessors covering only that

portion of Section 24 covered by the 1946 lease which had been
5

excluded from of the Roosevelt Unit.
'l:nended Complaint).
'u

as the

195~

'•~1ticant

(Exhibit "E" of the

This lease, which is hereinafter referred

lease, was on a standard Producers Form 88 with

modifications to certain clauses.

Stricken from

lease were provisions relating to the primary term and

delay rentals holding the ledsc>.

lnstt'dd,

the·

l(',J.~·

·er:iuired

commencement of operations fur reworkirg and redrilling a well
that had been previously drilled in the S\<1/4 of Section 24
within six months, with no right to extend the lease by the
payment of delay rentals.
on April 28,

This lease was released by Phillips

1955. (Exhibit "F" to the Amended Complaint).

No further development has occurred on the lands
excluded from the Roosevelt Unit.

As indicated by the

Affidavit of Joseph Fazzio and the exhibits thereto filed at
the request of the district court, the Plaintiffs were in
regular contact with Phillips from 1979 concerning the subject
land and Phillips'

lack of exploration or development thereon.

On October 10, 1980 Carl Noel, on behalf of the Plaintiffs,
wrote a letter to Phillips demanding release of the land for
several reasons including Phillips' unreasonable delay in
conducting any developmental operations upon the leasehold.
(Paragraphs 49 and Sb of the Amended Complaint and Exhibit "C"
of the Motion to Dismiss).
A complaint was filed May 12, 1982 to quiet title
against Phillips and its assignees and successors, and also
against J .A. and Fern Houston as the grantees n'imed in a stL<':
mineral deed executed by Lorna HeminP,wav, unr<"l.lt<'d tn thP
Phillips leases.

Un June 1 O,

1982 an Amended (>ir"pl.i

Lilt

w'is

9

tiled correcting certain minor errors in the names of the
ra rt i es.
Phillips responded to the Amended Complaint on July
1982, by way of a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was

2b,

Joined by the Roosevelt Unit, Inc.

Other named defendants have

filed disclaimers of interest, or in the case of David Monnich,
a general denial by way of answer.

J.A. Houston and Fern

Houston could not be located by the process server and are
presumed to be dead.
A hearing was held on the Motion to Dismiss on
:fovember '!, 1982, before the Honorable Richard C. Davidson.

At

the close of the hearing, Judge Davidson took the Motion under
advisement and allowed counsel ten (10) days in which to
supplement the record.

On December 6, 1982 Judge Davidson

issued a Minute Entry, and a Judgment was signed and entered
December 30, 1982, dismissing the first, second, third, fourth,
fifth and portions of the seventh causes of action with
prejudice, and the fifth, sixth and portions of the seventh
without prejudice.
On January 14, 1983 a Motion to Reconsider the
!l..,cision and a Motion for Leave to Amend were filed by the
lciilltiffs.
I

These motions were denied by the district court,

this appeal was consequently taken.

10
ARGUMENT
I.

THE STANDARD Oil APPEAL REQIJ l RES fHAT Ti!E /"ACTS
ALLEGED IN THE M1ENUEU COMPLA1Il1 H~ ACCEPTED AS
TRUE AND INTERPRETED IN THE LIGHT t10ST
FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS.
As noted above, Phillips' response to the Plaintiffs'

Amended Complaint was by way of a Motion to Dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
joined by the Defendant Roosevelt Unit,

Inc.

This motion was
The only answer

filed was from the Defendant David Monnich, and was basically
general denial.

d

Although the record has been supplemented by

both parties through memoranda supporting and opposing the
Motion to Dismiss, no discovery has been permitted, and there
has been no responsive pleading by Phillips as to any of the
factual allegations contained in the Amended Complaint.

The

district court chose to dismiss four counts of the complaint
with prejudice and two counts without prejudice.

Leave to

amend was denied.
Dismissal of a complaint with prejudice, before trial
and before an answer has been filed by the defendant is a
drastic measure, particularly in a factually complex case such
as the present one.

Such a dismissal is neither just nor

necessary in the eyes of most legal authorities, and has been
looked upon with disfavor by this Court.

2A >loorl',

Federal Procedure, Paragraph 12.08 (2d Ed. 1:18Jl,

•Jrl

>lo<Ht'

0

S

Fecleril

11

Rule lL(bJ (bJ, which is almost identical to the Utah version,
Slrttes as follows:
A [complaint] may be dismissed on motion if
clearly without any merit; and this want of
merit may consist in an absence of law to
support a claim of the sort made, or of facts
sufficient to make a good claim, or in the
disclosure of some fact which will necessarily
defeat the claim.
But a complaint should not be dismissed for
insufficiency unless it a~pears to a certainty
that plaintiff is entitle to no relief under
any stated facts which could be proved in
support of the claim. Pleadings are to be
liberally construed. Mere vagueness or lack
of detail is not grounds for a motion to
dismiss, but should be attacked by a motion
for a more definite statement.
(Emphasis in the
original, citations omitted).
The standard by which the Utah Supreme Court has
~easured

appeals from motions to dismiss is stated in

~

Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., Inc., 13 Utah 2d 339, 374
P.2d

254, 256,

(1962):

In the face of the motion to dismiss the
complaint, the trial court and this court
on review, are obliged to survey its
allegations in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff; and in a similar manner to
indulge in its favor all reasonable
inferences as to proof that may be adduced
thereunder.
From the standpoint of the
administration of justice it is wise and
desirable to adhere to a policy of being
reluctant to turn a party out of court
without trial.
lt can justifiably be
done only if the party could not in any
event establish a right to recover.

12
See also Holbrook v. Adams, 542 P.2d 1'!1

1lltah 1'17)

v. Simonsen, 214 Kan. 722, 522 P.2d

(1'174).

IJ~l

,,.Jno 111ms

In this appeal the facts alleged in the Amended
Complaint must be taken as true.

This much is admitted even

bv

the opposing party (Page 4 of the Reporters Transcript of
Hearing on Motion Proceedings before the Honorable Richard C.
Davidson, November 9, 1982 [referred to hereinafter as
"Transcript"]).

The inferences to be drawn from the facts

alleged in the Amended Complaint are to be viewed from a
perspective which is most favorable to the Plaintiffs.

In no

event should the Plaintiffs be precluded from their right to a
trial on the merits at this level, even before discovery has
taken place, unless "it appears to a certainty that plaint1ff
would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which
could be proved in support of the claim."

Blackham v.

Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d 157, 280 P.2d 453, 455 (1955).

As will be

shown below, the Amended Complaint dismissed by the district
court clearly does allege facts, which,

if taken as true

together with inferences deduced therefrom, would entitle
Plaintiffs to some relief.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED fW Rr~SULVl!H; FAC ['llAL
ISSUES IN ITS DECISION GRANTl<i1; PHILLJPS' 111JJ1J;,
DISMISS.

A. The court improperly dismissed withuut
prejudice the Plaintiffs fifth anJ sixth causes of

i''

13

action when it found, as a matter of fact, that
adequate notice of breach of implied covenants had
not been given to Phillips.
The Amended Complaint alleged in the fifth and sixth
causes of action that Phillips had breached implied covenants
ot the leases in question to develop the subject property and
to further explore for oil and gas.
The lessee's convenants implied in an oil and gas
lease for development and further exploration are based upon
the requirement of cooperation, integral to any contractual
relationship.

The lessor to an oil and gas lease gives up the

exclusive privilege of exploration, and drilling for and
extracting oil and gas from the property.

In return, the

lessee promises to give the lessor a royalty on production
under the lease.

The benefit of the lease to the lessor

is therefore intimately tied to the diligent operation of the
leasehold by the lessee.

If the lessee does nothing to develop

the premises, lessor's returns on the lease are delayed
1ndetinitelv.

The requirement of cooperation demands that the

lessee conduct its operations in a manner which will accomplish
the µuroose, i.e., the development of the resources underlying
c1e

-"-':_,

rrernises (See, generally, 5 Williams & C!eyers, Oil and Gas
~di'l,

~ ~·

and citations therein).
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This requirement of cooperdtion which demar'

that

the lessee act in a manner reasonably Jesigned to promote the
interests of the lessor in the lease is heightened when the
lease is committed to a unit area, since the possibilities for
abuse of the lessor's interest by the lessee are much greater.
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson,

supra,

and

various exhibits to pleading and memoranda (Exhibits "F" and
"G" to the Supplement to Response to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, Affidavit of Joseph Fazzio and exhibits thereto and
Exhibit "H" to the Affidavit of Nicholas F. McKean)

indicate

that there was great opposition to the formation of the
Roosevelt Unit and to the inclusion therein of several leases
because of the fear that Phillips would use this as a tactic to
hold the leases as long as possible without exploration or
development of the natural resources under lease.

The Peterson

case discusses what should be the mutual benefits to parties to
an oil and gas lease which has been joined to a unit and the
duties owed by the lessee to the lessor to ensure that the
lessor receives these benefits:
The practice of unitization by a power
granted the lessee in advance, it faithfully
carried out, will be fair and profitable both
to the lessor and lessee, dnd is vital to the
oil and gas industry in the interest of
conservation of both natural and ffidteridl
resources.
It should be upheld, alrhuugh tho'

15

ground of power is in general terms, because
it is subject to implied terms that will
prevent arbitrary and unfair dealing, will
require compliance with the implied covenants
in the lease for the benefit of the lessor
and will oppose a rigid standard of good faith
on the part of the lessee. (At 933).
As is obvious from this case, the potential for abuse by
the lessee when joining a lease to a unit is enormous.

The lessee

can commit a very small portion of the lease to a unit so that the
lessor will not be fairly compensated for his lease.

The court

likened the relationship between the lessor and the lessee under a
unit agreement to be that between principal and agent. The agent
can do nothing adverse to the interests of the principal without
the principal's full knowledge and consent.

The court stated:

The agent owes the duty to exercise a
high degree of good faith and loyalty for
the furtherance and advancement of the
interest of his principal.
Where there is also a lessor-lessee
relationship the agent-lessee is also
obligated to keep and perform the implied
covenants of his lease.
A lessee is bound by implied covenants of
of the lease to diligently explore and
develop the lease, and to do so under a
fair unitization plan, if unitization is
affected; to market the production if oil
and gas is found in paying quantities; to
do that which an operator of ordinary
prudence, having due regard for both lessor
and lessee, would do; and, in the case of
unitization to act fairly and in good faith,
with due regard for the lessor's interest,
and to provide for a fair apportionment of

16
the oil produced.
The lessee clearly m1
not act arbi.trarily or capriciously. I·,: ':134).
The Amended Complaint allesed that notice of
Phillips' breach of these implied covenants was given to
Phillips, specifically identifying a letter from Carl Noel,
representing the interest of the Plaintiffs,

to Phillips.

The

district court ruled in its Minute Entry, which was
incorporated by reference into the judgment, as follows:
These actions appear to be premature in
that adequate notice of default and
opportunity to correct has not been given
to Defendant Phillips.
For this reason,
Plaintiffs' fifth and sixth causes of action
are dismissed without prejudice.
After the ruling Plaintiffs requested leave to amend
their complaint to allege that notice had been given
generally rather than allege specifically that the letter from
Carl Noel constituted notice.

The Motion for Leave to Amend

was denied, without comment by the district court.
The district court, when ruling on a motion for
summary disposition of a case, cannot permit itself to act as
the finder of fact.

Rather,

pleadings must be accepted as true

and all inferences to be drawn therefrom should be in favor of
the Plaintiff and against the moving party.
Inc. v. Whitmore Construction Co.

Inc.,

1980); Liquor Control Commission v.

L & A Drvwall,

608 P. 2d 626

Athas,

121

(Utah

Utah 457,

2c+l

17

P.2rl 441

(1952); Fraunhofer v. Price, 594 P.2d 324 (Mont.

I 9 7 <J) •

By its Minute Entry and Judgment, the district court
acted as the finder of fact, ruling that no adequate notice had
been given of Phillips' breach of covenants implied in the
lease.
The adequacy of notice and whether notice was
actually given are clearly questions of fact.

Phillips, before

the district court, argued that "notice" of breach of the
implied covenants must be a formal written document specifying
the party charged with the breach, identifying the nature of
the breach, notifying the breaching party of the breach and
demanding that the breach be remedied or cured, or that the
contract or agreement be cancelled.

Yet in none of those cases

cited by Phillips does it appear that effective notice can be
given only through such a formal instrument, and that nothing
else will suffice.
Phillips ignores the purpose underlying the judicial
policv requiring notice to be given to the party breaching an
implied covenant of an agreement.

The purpose of notice is to

make the breaching party aware of its breach and to give that
••rtv an opportunity co cure the breach.

18
For this reason,

the focus

in similar casec; .1as not

been whether such a formal instrument <lf "nutice" h.1s been
served upon the breaching party,

but,

rdther,

an inquiry

int•l

the state of mind of the party charged with the breach of the
implied covenant;

that is, whether the breaching party knew of

its breach of the covenants it had taken upon itself in
entering into the lease.
P.2d 593, 596 (Okla.

An example is Lyons v. Robson, 330

1958) which was an action seeking

cancellation of an oil and gas lease due to the failure of the
lessee to develop portions of the land under lease.

The

defendant attacked the sufficiency of the notice of breach of
the implied covenant to develop and the court ruled as
follows:
On the question of notice the rule applied
is that what constitutes a reasonable notice
is a question of fact to be determined from
the circumstances of each case.
In Brown v. Schaffer, Okl. 325 P.2d 743, it
was held that no particular form of notice to
further develop is required.
Written notice
is not necessary.
We are convinced that the action of the
plaintiffs in the present action made it
known to the defendant that it was the
desire of the plaintiffs that the defendants
either release the property or further develop
it.
In the case of Alphin v. Gulf Refining Companv,
F.Supp. 570 (D.C. Ark. 1941 ), an oil dnd g,as

LecJse

Wds

JY

exec11t• I
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in April of 1919.
lj!l

No wells were drilled under the lease after

and the lease was assigned to the defendant in 1936.

One

,,f the plaintiffs spoke with the vice president of the

defendant company concerning lack of development on the land,
and was advised that the defendant was "not going to do
anything with it unless there was some development in the
vicinity that would warrant them drilling it."

On March 23,

1938 the plaintiffs addressed a letter to the defendant
formally requesting an execution of a release of the lease
because they considered the defendant's inactivity on the lease
to he an abandonment and forfeiture of the lease.
As stated by the court:
This testimony is not denied, but counsel
ingeniously argue that the action on the
part of the plaintiffs was nothing more than
a notice, which in itself was an attempt to
declare forfeiture and that the mere
announcement by the lessee, the defendant
company, of an intention not to drill, would
not excuse the lessor's failure to give
further notice.
It is contended that the action of the
plaintiffs did not amount to a demand for
compliance with the covenant to develop.
This argument was not accepted by the court.
cuurt, referring to the testimony stated:
Certainlv the defendant company knew from
that conversation that the plaintiffs
expected the defendant company to comply
with the covenants of the lease. A few
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Also, this Court in 8jork v. April lndustri s, Inc.,
547 P.2d 219, 220 (Utah l':J76) appeal after remand, '.:>bO P.2d 31),
cert.

denied 431 U.S. 930, ':J7 S.Ct. 7634, 53 L.Ed. 2d. 245

stated, "Demand is not necessary where both parties have equal
knowledge of the contract provisions, or where the defaulting
party denies the allegation."
It is abundantly clear from the facts alleged in the
Amended Complaint, and from inferences derived therefrom, that
Phillips has not acted in good faith in discharging its duties
under the lease and unit agreement.

Production from the unit

is low (Paragraphs 44 through 47 of the Amended Complaint).
Only a small portion of the lands Phillips claims to hold
under lease can participate in the royalties from production
from the unit.

Phillips has not attempted to develop these

lands since 1954.

And yet Phillips purports to hold these

lands by the payment of 25f an acre each year ad infinitum, or
so long as there is any production from the Roosevelt Unit.
The inequities of this certainly cannot be said to be unknown
to Phillips.
U.S.

See, Sander v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. 292

272, 291, 54S.Ct. 671, 674, L.Ed. 1255 (1954); Neffv.

Jones, 288 P.2d 712 (Okla. 1955).

But Phillips insists it muse

be given formal written notice of its duties and covenants Lu

23
rhe Plaintiffs and notice of the fact that it has been in
oreach for all these years.
The record indicates that as early as 1951 the
Plaintiffs predecessors in interest were concerned with
Phillips' procrastination in developing the property under
lease.

(Exhibit "F" to Supplemental to Plaintiff's response to

:,lotion to Dismiss).

The affidavit filed by Joseph Fazzio and

its supporting exhibits indicates that Mr. Fazzio was in
contact with employees of Phillips from November 1979.

His

disgruntlement with the lack of operations upon the leasehold
~ropertv

is quite obvious.

For Phillips to claim, and for the

district court to rule without even the benefit of weighing the
evidence, that these conversations, letters and demands did not
~ive

Phillips notice that it was breaching its responsibilities

as lessee to the Plaintiffs to develop the leasehold and to
further explore for other potentially productive horizons
strains the imagination.

H.

The district court improperly dismissed Plaintiffs'
first cause of action with prejudice on factual
grounds.
The First Cause of Action of the Amended Complaint

,

i~v,ed

char at the time the 1945 leases were executed,

24

Phillips did not have authority to conduct business within LhP
State of Utah.

As such, under Section 18-8-5 Utah Code Ann.

1943, the leases were void.

The Amended Complaint went on to

allege that Phillips then induced Plaintiffs' predecessors in
interest to execute another lease in 1946 by misleading them as
to the validity of the 1945 leases.

The Plaintiffs'

predecessors relied upon this misrepresentation to their
detriment in executing the 1946 lease.
The district court dismissed the first cause of
action with prejudice.

As stated in its Minute Entry:

"The court finds that the Plaintiffs or their
predecessors in interest had notice or could
have discovered the facts which they now claim
to give rise to the allegation of fraud on the
part of Phillips Petroleum."
The court went on to cite §78-12-26(3) Utah Code Ann.
1953 as the applicable statute of limitations barring the
Plaintiffs' claim against Phillips.
It is obvious from the language of the Minute Entry
that the district court invaded the territory of the trier of
fact.

There is nothing in the record evidencing that the

Plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest had actual notice

25
.,f the deception of Phillips at any time prior to 1981.

The

Jistrict court, in stating that the Plaintiffs could have
discovered the fraud, speculates as to whether the Plaintiffs
should have reasonably had notice.
and not a legal

This is clearly a factual

issue, and therefore outside the scope of the

district court's discretion on a motion to dismiss.

C.

The district court failed to recognize the factual
issues contained in the second cause of action of
the Amended Complaint in dismissing it with
prejudice.
The second cause of action of the Amended Complaint

alleged that the 1946 lease was executed by the Plaintiffs'
predecessors in interest to correct errors contained in the
1945 leases.

It was the intention of the Plaintiffs'

predecessors in interest to convey a new interest to Phillips
beyond that which they intended to convey in 1945.

Since the

1946 lease related back to the 1945 leases, and since it was
the intent of the lessors for it to do so, the 1946 lease
inherited and suffered from the same defects of the 1945 leases
and was void.
The district court in its Minute Entry ruled on the
•~cund

cause of action as follows:
The Court having reviewed the 1946 leases
(sic) finds that the leases (sic) were
given "in correction and in lieu of two

26
leases."
This language clearly shows that the l9q6
leases (sic) were new leases (sic) which
replaced the 1945 leases.
In addition, the
differing descriptions also show the 1946
leases (sic) to be new.
Consequently, the
1946 leases (sic) are valid and the
Plaintiffs second cause of action is
therefore dismissed.
The court accepted Phillips'

argument that the 1946

lease was a new lease replacing the 1945 leases.
district court failed to see from the facts plead,
inferences to be drawn therefrom,

But the
and the

that it was the intent of the

Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest not to make a new lease,
but merely to make corrections in the 1945 leases.

It should

be noted that the 1946 lease was expressly modified so that the
end of the primary term would be on the same date as the 1945
leases.

The 1946 lease omitted a clause contained in the 1945

leases requiring seismographic work to be done on the property
within a year, but this work had been done prior to the
execution of the 1946 lease.

Finally,

there is a difference

between the description of the property covered by the 1945
leases and the 1946 lease.

As noted in the Statement of racts,

all land omitted from the 1946 lease was leased by Phillips
under other leases

(Exhibits "A" and "B" to Defendants' '·lotion

to Dismiss).
A lease is a conveyance.
v.

Tax Commission 4 Utah 2d 236,

Consolidated llrani111n
291

t'.2d 8':i'l

1l:J':l'J1.

li1i<·'
11
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should be construed in a manner similar to other conveyances.
~rnggins

v. ?aper, 548 SW. 2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).

A

c,irrection deed relates back to the original conveyance and
takes its validity from that conveyance.
Farm, Inc. v.

Kernan Livestock

Multnomah County, 224 Or. 87, 355 P.2d 719

\1%0); Fenn v. Boxwell, 312 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958);
ifason v.

Jarrett, 234 S.W.2d 771

(Ark. 1950).

If the original

conveyance is void then it is incapable of reformation by an
instrument intended to correct it without a showing that it was
the express intent of the parties to ratify the void
conveyance.

Buell Cabinet Company v. Sudduth, 608 F.2d 431

(llJth Cir., 1'179); Kearns v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 272
'LY.S. 2d 535 (1966); 9 Thompson, Thompson on Real Property,
Section 4675.
The case of Bowers v. Cottrell, 15 Idaho 221, ':16 P.
93b

(1~08)

provides an illustration of this rule of law.

There, a mother executed certain deeds in favor of her daughter
~hich

were never delivered nor recorded.

The deeds were later

recorded by the daughter without the knowledge or consent of
the mother.

The county recorder later requested that the

.n,>tr1er execute a correction deed because there was an error in
·~e
'!

Jescript1on contained in one of the deeds.

The daughter

no knuwledge of this request by the county recorder.

The

28

delivery and intent on the p.-nt ut the mother to cunvev the
property to her daughter.

The correction deed executed by the

mother at the request of the county recorder was also
ineffective to pass title to the daughter.

The court

explained:
The former deed being void, and the latter
deed being executed to correct an error,
and not for the purpose of conveying title,
does not amount to a ratification of the same,
or pass title thereto.
(At 942)
rhe facts as alleged indicate that there was no
intent on the part of the Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest
to execute a new lease in 1946 which would breathe new life
into the void 1945 leases.
The face of the 1946 lease itself contains
ambiguities that would require the court to look further into
the facts surrounding its execution.

The 1946 lease states

that it is "in correction and in lieu of" the 1945 leases.

correction deed is generally used to correct errors in the
original deed and not as a substitute for the original deed.
The words "in lieu of" do not necessarilv implv the second
instrument is a substitute for the first.

Humble Oil

Kefining Co. v. i·!ullican, 192 S.,-l.2d 7711 1[c>x.
Generally,

the purpose for the

corre·~ti,1n

c•r

C.

l'-i-101.

scii,,;r

ir_11r,• ·le•«

A

29
,•_,ir"'d

on che fdce of Che second instrument.

ud l,o.,

Nebletc v. Placid

257 So.:Zd 167 (La. App. 1972).
The intenc of the parties with respect to the

incerpretation of a written instrument is to be drawn from the
four corners of the instrument.

h53 \Utah 1979).

Hartman v. Potter, 569 P.2d.

However if the instrument is ambiguous or

susceptible to differing interpretations, the intent cannot be
ascertained by looking to the document itself and other facts
must be examined to divine the parties' intent.

As stated in

International Engineering Co. v. Daun Industries, 102 Idaho
JoJ, 6JO P.2d 155, 1'.J7 (1981):
\fuere the language of a written agreement
is clear and una~biguous, the trial court
will give effect to the language employed
according to its ordinary meaning,
determination of its meaning and legal
effect being a question of law.
But, when the terms of a written contract
are ambiguous, its interpretation and
meaning become a question of fact and
instrinsic evidence may be considered by
the trier of fact in an attempt to arrive
at the true intent of the contracting
parties.
In doing so the trier of fact
may consider the objective and purpose of
the particular provisions and may also
scrucinize che circumstances surrounding
che formation of contract.
If the contract
1s reasonably subject to conflicting
interpretation, it is ambiguous. (Citations
ommicedl.

30

See also Neblett v. Placid Oil Cu., S_.':.11'._r_:J_; llumbll' Oi 1
v. Mullican, supra.
From the facts plead and from the inferences that shouL
drawn from those facts in favor of the Plaintiffs, it would appedr
that there was no intent to ratify the void 1945 leases by the
Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest by their execution of the
lease.

I~,,

This ambiguity is susceptible to resolution only after

evidence relevent to the intent of the parties at the time of the
execution of the 1946 lease are examined.

It is premature to

resolve such a question of fact by a motion to dismiss before
Defendant has filed an answer and discovery has been allowed.

III.

THE UISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT THE 1954
LEASE WAS SEPARATE FROM THE 1945 AND 1946 LEASES,
DISMISSING THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION WITH PREJUDICE.
A.

The intent of the parties in entering into the
1954 lease was a question of fact and not
susceptible to determination under a motion to
dismiss.

The third cause of action of the Amended Complaint recite
the fact that the Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest entered

inc,'

two leases dated November 30, 1945, a subsequent lease in l 94b,
Agreement of 1952, and a third lease in October of 1954.
lease was released in April of 1955.

The Amended CompLnnc

that the release of the 19)4 lease acted _;s

,J

interest Phillips had in that parcel of land.

r<'lc>dse

,it

1

I1

dlc'
1

[~,
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The district court,
wcP

in its Minute Entry, ruled on the third

uf action as follows:
The Court finds the 1954 lease did not include
all the lands covered by the 1946 leases (sic)
and therefore was a separate and distinct
lease.
When the 1954 lease was released in
1955, the 1946 leases (sic) were left
undisturbed.
For that reason, Plaintiffs
third cause of action is dismissed.
The district court left unanswered the question of why the

~rties

entered into the 1954 lease in the first place if the 1946

ledse was valid.
;ease did not

The court makes mention of the fact that the 1954

include all the lands covered by the 1946 lease.

What

ts inconsistent in the district court's decision is that it held the
JQ46 lease to be a substitute for the 1945 leases,
'.ease

even though this

did not cover all lands included in the 1945 leases, and yet

;dled that the 1954 lease was a new and separate lease not affecting
~ne

1 940 lease.
The Plaintiffs' predecessors joined the Roosevelt Unit

.\~reement

(Exhibit "B" to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss), but on

chat same day another agreement was executed by Phillips and the
'Liintiffs' predecessors in interest whereby Phillips agreed that:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the Unit
Agreement for development and operation of
the Roosevelt Unit (I.Sec. No. 886) to which
the above described lease may have been
committed by the Lessee or Lessor pursuant to
the provisions of Section 12 of said Lease
or otherwise, unless Lessee shall on or before
November 12, 1952, commence or cause to be
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commenced operations for the drilling of ;
well for oil and gas at a location of L~ssees
selection on the above described lands dnd
thereafter drill such well in accordance with
provisions of such Unit Agreement and an
approved plan for development thereunder,
the said (1946) lease shall terminate.
(Exhibit "A" to the Supplement to Plaintiffs' Response to the Mo tic
to Dismiss).
Although a well appears to have been drilled pursuant to
this agreement, it was a poor producer, plagued with problems
abandoned in 1954.

and~

(Exhibits "B", "C", "D", "E" & "G" Supplement

Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss).

The 1954 lease was the

executed, requiring Phillips to rework the well within six months

c'

release the lands, with no right to extend the term by the payment
delay rentals.

This certainly raises a factual question as to the

intent of the parties.

At the very least it points to the

possibility that Phillips and the Plaintiffs' predecessors struck a
new deal, modifying Phillips' rights to hold these lands outside

Cl,

unit participation area without actual production on the lands.
There are several legal theories supporting the Plaintif;
contention that the intent shown by these documents indicates thJI
Phillips did not claim its interest in the subject property under:·
1946 lease, but rather by the 1954 lease and that when it released
the 1954 lease it released all interest it held in the subject pac.
which was excluded from the participating area of the Roosevelt
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nit.
1

These theories are discussed in more detail below.

It was an

for the district court to dismiss the third cause of action

r,ir

.ccn Lo do so required the court to make a factual determination

regarding the intent of the parties in the execution of the 1954
lease.

B.

The district court improperly ruled, as a finding of fact
that the parties did not intend for Phillips' interest in
the subject parcel under the 1946 lease to merge into its
interest under the 1954 lease.
The third cause of action states that it was the intent of

tne parties in their execution of the 1954 lease that Phillips'
tnterest under the 1946 lease in the subject parcel would merge into
the 1YS4 lease.

A release of that lease would thereby release all

interest Phillips claimed in the subject parcel.

Before the district

court Phillips argued that, under the common law, merger would not
have occurred for various technical reasons.

However, the common law

approach to merger, with its automatic and often unintentional
effects, has been almost universally rejected.
The modern doctrine of the merger of two interests in land
in a party holding them simultaneously is primarily a question of the
tntention of the parties, gathered from their express statements or
lied from the surrounding circumstances.
)bb,

,1_,

-+lY P.2d 723

(i':IJ4J;

(1%b);

Bowman v. Cook, 101

Goldblat v.Cannon, 95 Colo. 419, 37

Dilts v. Brooks, 66 Mont. 346, 213 P. 600 (1923).
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Intention is a question of fact.
Company, 510 P.Ld SUl

Harri_s__~._

Alaska_I_ir-:.

Guarant·;

\Alaska 1':!71J); Fer»uson v. Hilborn, 4U2

I','·

914 (Okla. 1 965).
It is unknown why the 1954 lease was executed if Phillip,
really believed it had a leasehold estate on the oil and gas by
virtue of the 1946 lease.

Taking the facts as alleged and

drawin~

inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs it is likely that Phillips
believed it had no rights under the 1946 lease because the 1946 leas
was void or had terminated or expired.

It is possible that Phillii'

intended that its interest in the subject parcel, if any, under the

1946 lease, be confirmed and restated in the 1954 lease and merged
therewith.

The subsequent release of the 1954 lease would,

therefore, have operated as a release of any interest held by
Phillips under either the 1946 or 1954 lease.

The district court,

granting Phillips' Motion to Dismiss, refused to allow the Plaintlf:
their right to verify this claim that the parties intended to merge
Phillips' interest in the subject parcel in the 1954 lease.

C.

Phillips' acceptance of the 1954 lease acted as a
surrender of its rights under the 1946 lease to the
subject parcel and evidenced its intent to abandon those
rights.
In 1954 Phillips entered into ,m oil c1nd gas lease

covering a portion of land it already purpurterl to have in 1 ':!'+ 1'
This parcel, which is the subject ,,f the Laws111t, l·cJnt.1111ed rl«•

•
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',,J, excluded from participation in the production roydlties of the
,.~velt
,

1

d

fact,

Unit.

The 1954 lease is complete in all its particulars.

the 1954 lease is contained on the same printed lease form,

standdrd Producers Form 88, which Phillips used in 1946.

There are

.stgciificant differences in the habendum clause, which allow Phillips
t,1

hold the lease for only six months, within which time Phillips

~ust

commence reworking or redrilling a well on the property, with no

right to extend the term by payment of delay rentals.
Phillips, by the acceptance of this 1954 lease, surrendered
whdt interest it claimed under the 1946 lease in the parcel of land.
As stated in Diamanti v. Aubert, 68 Utah 582, 251 P. 373, 374

The execution of the new lease to one of
the original tenants, and its part
performance, amounted to a surrender of the
old lease by operation of law.
The reason for this termination of a lease by surrender
chrough the acceptance of a new lease is explained by Professor
Surnrners in his treatise on oil and gas law:
An oil and gas lease will be considered
as surrendered by operation of law where
acts of the parties are inconsistent with
continued existence of the lease. Thus
the acceptance of a new and valid lease
bv the lessee during the existence of
the new lease, where the parties intended
the new lease to take effect at once,
operates as a surrender of the first lease.
Abandonment of the premises by the lessee
and resumption of possession by the lessor

36
may amount to d s11rrenJer bv law.
Whe' ·• r
or not there has been a surrender bv
operational law is a question of in~ent
to be determineJ from the facts and
circumstances of the particular case.
0

The general effect of surrender of an oil
and gas lease is to terminate the existing
legal relations of the lessor and lessee
created by the lease.
3 Summers, Oil & Gas, Sections 524-525, at 451-452.
Upon the failure to drill a producing well after the 195lease, Phillips abandoned the property.

This intent to abandon is

shown by the release of the 1954 lease in 1955,

by the abandonmen'.

the well as evidenced by the records filed with the USGS, and bv
Phillips'

total failure to do anything with the subject parcel for

almost thirty years.

Because of the action of the district court

granting Phillips' Motion to Dismiss,

the Plaintiffs have been

precluded from developing evidence which would support their clai"
that Phillips has either surrendered or abandoned its interest in

1954 lease.

D.

The 1954 lease is a substitute contract for the 1946
lease and is a novation of Phillips' rights under the
1 946 lease.
At Page 4 of its Memorandum in Support of its ;foe ion c.

Dismiss, Phillips postulates a reason for the execut i<in of th,·
lease:
The 1945 leases and the 1946 lease

C<JflLdLtl
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significantly different terms. The difference
between these leases indicate that the real
reason for the 1946 lease was to enable the
parties to strike a different deal, as they
apparently wished to do.
If this were the reason for the 1946 lease, then why did
f'hil

1 ips execute the 1954 lease if not to "strike a different deal."

~hillips

cannot consistently argue that new contractual agreements

cuntained in the 1946 lease superseded and substituted for the 1945
ledses, but that the 1954 lease did not have a similar effect on the
1~46

lease for the subject parcel.

s~~erseding
~arcel

The 1954 lease was clearly a

contractual agreement whereby a leasehold on the subject

was granted in return for very specific and different

contractual obligations on the part of Phillips.
in

The 1954 lease was,

effect, a novation of the 1946 lease as it pertained to the

As stated in Elliot v. Whitney, 215 Kan. 256, 524 P.2d 699
I~

79 I :

Novation may be broadly defined as a
substitution of a new contract or obligation
for an old one which is thereby extinguished
(bb CJS, Novation, Section 1).
It is
a new contractual relation which has
four requisites: a previous valid
obligation, the parties must agree to the
new contract, the new contract must be
valid and the old obligation must be
extinguished by substitution for it of the
new one ( 1 5 Will is ton on Contracts, 3rd
tdit1on, Section 1869; 66 CJS, Novation,
Section Jl.
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The 1954 lease was a new contract,
execution.

It "ranted Phillips a

valid at :.1e time

<Jl

leasehold interest in the mineri_

estate, and Phillips took upon itself certain contractual obligatt
relevant to what should be the mutual goal of the parties,
of oil and gas from the property.

product~

This new valid contract,

the H-

lease, extinguished the 1946 lease as modified by the Unit
Agreement and the March 11,

1952 Agreement as it pertained to the

subject property.
The circumstances surrounding the execution of the 1954
lease clearly indicate the intent of the parties to enter into a
substitute contract.
Hansen, 594 P.2d 867
fact,

Novation is a question of intent.
(Utah 1979).

Robison v.

Since intent is a question of

the district court, by dismissing the third cause of action,

has denied the Plaintiffs their right to not only a day in court or.
this issue, but also to a right to an adequate response to this
question and an opportunity to pursue it through the judicial
system.
IV.

THE 1946 LEASE \.JAS SEGREGATED BY THE CONTRACTION OF
THE ROOSEVELT UNIT IN 1954 EXCLUDING THE SUBJECT
PARCEL FROM THE UNIT AREA AND PARTICIPATING AREA,
THEREBY EXCLUDING IT FROM A PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF
PRODUCTION ROYALTIES; AND THE EXCLUDED PARCEL COULD
NOT BE HELD BEYOND THE PRIMARY TERM OF THE 194b LEAS[
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE UNIT AGREEMENT.
The Roosevelt Unit orginallv encomoelssed 34,71 l.27

(Exhibit "A" to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

l.

It was

.1cr•

.1µpr·•"

1

'
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ftective October 15,
· :r,<'dn .1.
·~els

1951.

(Exhibit "G" to Affidavit of Nicholas F.

The one and only participating area of the Roosevelt Unit

revised effective February 1952 to include 3,281.50 acres.

'.E.xhibit "G" to Affidavit of Nicholas F. McKean).

The Roosevelt Unit

itself was contracted in size to the participating area effective
8ecember 1, 19)4.

(Exhibit "C" to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss).

Df the lands described in the 1946 lease only the Nl /2 of the NWl /4

uf Section 24 was included in the participating and unit area of the
Roosevelt Unit.

The remainder of the lands, which are the subject of

chis lawsuit, were excluded from the unit and, consequently, from
participation in the royalties.
In connection with the formation of the Roosevelt Unit,
Phillips wds required to go to Court to obtain a determination on the
\'aliditv of its rights as Lessee to commit the leases it held to the
unit.

ln Phillips Petroleum Company v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th

Cir. , 1954) it was ruled that under Sect ion 1 2 of the standard form
Jil and gas leases employed by Phillips in the area, including the
and 1 946 leases, Phillips had a right to unitize its leases.

I :145
'~e

court discussed the reasons for unitization and also the duties

r~1e

lessee owed to the lessors because of its right to unitize the

''"'I.
;11

!'he court stated that unitization was a practical necessity in
dnd gas industrv.

Rules and regulations governing the

'''", dnd production from wells, coupled with the physical laws
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affecting tne recovery of oi 1 and

l:\dS

pool or producing strata be worked as

dictate that pr<J;
~

:~tion

frui:

whole, without regard tu

L..

boundary units overlying the pool itself.
Section 12 of the 1946 lease provided Phillips with the
right to unitize, pool or combine any or all parts of the lease in.
unit with the terms of the lease to be modified to conform with the
terms and provisions of the Unit Agreement.

Section 16 (d) of the

Unit Agreement (Exhibit "A" to the Defendants' Memorandum in Suppor·
of the Motion to Dismiss) states:
Each lease, sublease or contract relating
to the exploration, drilling, development or
operation for oil or gas of any land commited
to this agreement, which, by its terms might
expire prior to the termination of this
agreement, is hereby extended beyond such
term so provided therein so that it may
be continued in full force and effect
for and during the term of this agreement,
subject to the rental provisions of Section
13 hereof.
Phillips has restricted the unit operations to the uoper
formations (i.e. the Green River Formation) and exploration or
development of the lower formations have been curtailed up to the
present, even though these lower formations have shown potential E·
production, as alleged in the Amended Complaint.

The oi 1 compank

have ignored requests by land owners and the USGS to develop these
formations.
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Section 13 of the Unit Agreement, as it relates to those
enldl

provisions, states as follows:
The parties hereto holding interest in
privately owned lands (the term "privately
owned land" as used herein shall not be
construed to include Indian land) within
the unit area consent and agree, to the
extent of their respective interests, that
each lease thereon which is committed hereto
may be continued in effect beyond the primary
term of such lease and during the term of this
agreement, provided, however, that as to any
portion of privately owned land subject to a
lease committed to this agreement which lies
outside a participating area the lessee shall
pay the delay rentals provided in the lease,
reduced in the proportion that the mineral or
royalty acre interest subject to such lease
in the land located in the participating area
bears to the total mineral or royalty acre
interest in all lands subject to such lease,
in the time, manner and amount provided by
such lease, subject to the right of surrender
provided for in Section 29.
Section 16 states:
The terms, conditions and provisions of all
leases, subleases and other contracts
relating to exploration, drilling, development
or operation of oil or gas of lands committed
to this agreement are hereby expressly
modified and amended to the extent necessary
to make the same conform to the provisions
hereof, but otherwise to remain in full force
and effect,
~

rom the language contained in the Unit Agreement, if there

lands ,if the lease excluded from the participating area,
·'~1nerit

the Unit

treats them differently than those within the participating

rhev are not

~iven

production royalties in proportion to their
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size with the participating area,

but Jelay rentals

conformity with the underlying lease.

<-1r,,

raiJ in

!'he Unit Agreement alsu

,L1

that the terms of the leases are modified to the extent necessarv
conform with the Unit Agreement, but the leases otherwise are to
remain in full force and effect.
From this it would appear that delay rentals were intendc
to hold that portion of the 1946 lease lying outside the
participating area.

Delay rentals will be paid in accordance with

the lease, but the lease provides that delay rentals can only hold
the lands for the primary term, and no longer.

The Uni c Agreement

does not require holding lands outside the unit beyond the primarv
term of the leases covering such lands.

The Unit Agreement is not

concerned with lands outside the unit area.

Therefore,

it is

entirely consistent that the clause in the Unit Agreement providinz
for the holding of lands by the payment of delay rentals is limitec
to the primary term, and that unless separate wells are drilled, ;w
production is obtained, on those lands outside the unit,

those lane'

will be released from the lease.
The provision in the Unit Agreement requiring the pavmec'.
of delay rentals is unusual in unit agreements of this type covert'.
lands in this area (Transcript at 41 ).

This interpretation is

entirely consistent with the March 11, 1952 Agretement \vhict1 re

1 ''

Phillips to commence the drilling of a well on th1e Lrnds e~<1'1'i'
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c the Roosevelt Unit before the expiration of the primary term of
, '"-'

I

Y..;b lease.
It is evident from the actions of the parties that this

i~terpretation

of the Unit Agreement was adopted by the parties.

In

a letter to the USGS, the unit operator spoke of the necessity to
drill a well on the 1946 lease before the expiration of the primary
term.

(Exhibit "C" to the Supplement to the Response to Defendants'

~otion

to Dismiss).

After the expiration of the primary term

?h1llips obtained a new lease from the Plaintiffs' predecessors in
interest requiring it to redrill a well on the lands excluded from
the participating area of the Roosevelt Unit.

At that time Phillips

acted as it it had no lease on, or interest in, the subject parcel
excluded from the participating area.
Phillips cannot now, almost thirty years later, claim it
has an interest in the subject parcel.

The subject parcel was

separated and treated differently from the other lands covered by the
lj~6

lease oy its exclusion from production of the Roosevelt Unit,

anJ,

consequently, it cannot now be held by Phillips solely by virtue

ot production from the Roosevelt Unit.
n

By treating the subject lands

Deing held bv production from the Roosevelt Unit, the district
rt

w~s

in error, and its Judgment dismissing the fourth cause of

•f the Amended Complaint must be reversed.

CONCLUSION
As

ca11

t"le

-..:;1._-'er1

case, dealing with corn pl

t)v

tilt'

,Jis('11-..;...;1\ 1 11

dnd

LCdteJ,

,_i

ft en

r111s

l1t-'t1·1n,

st:e-rn1 n~i_,,

transactions occuring over thirty vears ago.

l.">

L1Jnt rr:t<i LL

To Ji sm1ss

r:_

s11ch

)~
d

at the pleading stage, without allowing the p,uties an opo<lrtun1:
distill the facts

through discovery,

and witnout

the d1str1ct co

1

F

having the benefit of hearing and weighing what would undouhtedl·1
voluminous and contradictory evidence,

is clearly erroneous.

The interpretation and legal effect of manv of the
transactions sued upon must be determined according to
the participants at the time.

For example,

what W<>s the

the parties in executing the 1 946 oil and gas

lease·;

lease intended to relate back to the 1945 leases,
Why diJ the parties execute an oil and ?,as

the intenc

lease

...:as

1

the

I~~·

which were v01i
in 1954 cuveric. 0

lands it now claims it held by virtue of the 1 ':J4b lease'
just a few of the important questions which must be
discovery and trial, and which cannot,

intent,,:

l'hese ,.

rnswere;d thr.·

and should not,

be dec1Je

the district court on a motion to dismiss.
For the foregoing reasons the Plaint1frs-Appellants
respectfully submit that the decision of the district co11rt -;rJro·
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should l!e l''-'Versc·d
remanded.
DATED t:t1is

23~~a:;

1Jt

J111H·,

I~.~

l.

rnd

rh1s

c'

"c
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Respectfully submitted,

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants

46
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